Thursday, June 18, 2009

Two German guards, both raised Catholic, were both deeply disturbed by what they witnessed in Auschwitz. Though they had long ago rejected the superstitions of their parents' religion for more enlightened modern philosophies, their consciences stilled panged them. Eduard, the younger of the two, cautiously asked in a hushed tone if a "final solution" for Herr Mengele might be the moral thing to do. Claus could not believe his ears. Even as the thought had entered his mind nights before, he knew he had to put a stop to talk like this before it got out of hand. "I believe that anyone can come to the truth. Herr Mengele deserves the chance to turn away from this evil. I cannot condone the taking of his life."


thoughts?

26 comments:

  1. Tyrannicide, eh? According to the Catholic Encyclopedia, Tyrannicide is always impermissible in the event of tyranny of oppression (that is, a legitimate ruler who abuses his power), but sometimes permissible in the event of tyranny by usurpation (a ruler who illigitimately seizes power).

    I have a hard time imagining how the assassination of a tyrant couldn't be justified, provided some criteria similar to Just War doctrine are met. In particular, I would think that in order for tyrannicide to be permissible, there has to be a reasonable hope that the assassination will end the tyranny, which is probably not the case in most circumstances, as removing an evil, powerful man from power will only open a power vacuum that other evil men will bicker over. The problem with tyrannicide is it has no guarantee that the oppression will end.

    A couple famous cases of tyrannicide:
    Claus von Stauffenberg claimed the right under natural law to defend the lives of millions by assassinating Hitler. Whether that would have happened, had he been successful, is debatable. On the one hand, Hitler was a charismatic figurehead, and his removal might have thrown the Nazi party into disarray at a key moment during the war, allowing the Allies the ability to quickly finish it. On the other hand, it might also have allowed a competent military strategist the chance to run the German army, and dragged out the war for a few more years.

    Charlotte Corday's assassination of Jean-Paul Marat was driven by tyrannicide, but in this case very clearly did not produce the desired result, and arguably, just made the reign of terror worse.

    Whether Mengele can rightly be considered a tyrant (which depends on how much political influence he wielded) is relevant to the debate. Also of concern is whether or not a private citizen can take the law into his own hands when there is no legitimate government to exercise justice.

    I think in this case, there is not enough guarantee that assassination will produce a good result; while many lives may be saved, since it does not change the power structure, there is no guarantee that an even more evil man may take his place. Also, it may just galvanize the opposition against you by making him a martyr, and push people who were on the fence about the evilness of your enemy onto his side.

    If the question is whether or not we shouldn't assassinate someone because he might convert, if you are in the midst of murdering people, and I have a gun and a clear shot, I'm not going to wait to see if you change your mind. While it may be possible for a miracle to happen and an evil man turns good, I'm of the opinion that you don't base your plans around a miracle happening.

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  2. I mostly agree with Joe, but as I understand it, killing in self-defense (or defense on behalf of another) is only permissible when the death of the attacker is the result of the fact that the only available effective means of stopping the attacker are likely to be lethal. This would seem to prohibit all deliberate assassinations.

    The death penalty may only be administered by a lawful authority in cases where it is the only effective means to protect citizens from harm (basically the same case as above).

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  3. I'm with you 100% on the last paragraph, Joe.

    So did I read this wrong, or do we (the Catholic Church) agree that the action itself may be objectively good, but that it must be weighed against likely outcomes so that a worse situation may not occur. It kind of reminds me of the whole removing a baby from the fallopian tubes to save the mother kind of reasoning or the just war reasoning like you point out.

    Dave, wouldn't you say that the only way to prevent Herr Mengele would have to be lethal since the authorities are corrupt and on his side? As far as the death penalty goes, I'd say that lawful authority only matters when their is a lawful authority. If we are talking about the wild west and there is no lawful authority, I'd think that you could in fact execute people for the same reasons that a lawful authority could, but only because the lawful authority doesn't exist.

    Just just to restate my question (or actually state it for the first time): is there nothing inherintly wrong in killing Joseph Mengele except for the indirect worse evil that might result? If it wasn't for the possible indirect and unintended results, would the act be a non-sin? Can we agree that my fictional Claus's comments are ridiculous?

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  4. I think the Church's position is that this kind of assassination is never morally permissible. Capital punishment can only be carried out by a just authority, which we, acting alone, are not. The only way killing him would be permissible is if our action would be preventing immediate, grave, and certain harm from befalling someone, and the only way of carrying this out would be to use lethal force. Assassinating him as he comes home from work, or as he prays in church, is still murder.

    I, personally, accept this on faith only, as my fallen nature and thirst for vengeance against the wicked would cause me to pervert a good desire into the evil act of murder. It's only through God's grace that I know that it is evil to enact revenge on the wicked.

    Claus' comments are indeed ridiculous. The idea that a man so evil and so given over to sin could suddenly one day walk away from it all is just as ridiculous as the belief that an infinite, eternal, and omnipotent being would humble himself to become human, die, and rise from the dead three days later, saving us from sin and death. That is, it is so ridiculous that, had it not happened, it would be laughable. Ridiculous, but not absurd.

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  5. "The only way killing him would be permissible is if our action would be preventing immediate, grave, and certain harm from befalling someone, and the only way of carrying this out would be to use lethal force. Assassinating him as he comes home from work, or as he prays in church, is still murder."

    Ok, let me shift gears slightly then. The Church doesn't actually condemn military ambushes does it? I mean we don't have to say "Put 'em up!" before we start shooting right? Like in Enemy at the Gates, the German officers that our hero shoots didn't appear to be any imminent threat at the moment, but they were understandably an imminent threat.

    I mean if I change it from German guards to Jews who somehow get weapons and say that they plan to sneak up on Mengele in his sleep, where's the sin? I don't see how changing it from Germans to Jews changes the morality of it, but I'll throw it out there for perspective.

    I ain't going to reject in will and mind if the Church says it's so, but I am looking for a reason why. And I'm not trying to be difficult, but I just have so many exmaples in my mind like the above mentioned Jewish one that just don't seem to make sense to me how that's wrong. It's not like we're talking about a young non-political Hitler who's done nothing worse than hate people. I'm talking about an established torturer who will from any reasonable perspective torture again and with the blessing of the established authority. How does that not fall into the same category of morality as military ambushes?

    I don't think it's fair to say that they aren't in a "war" and therefore they don't get the benefits that come with "morals in war" or whatever. They would be in reality a worse situation where it would be like a two man vs 1 million people war. The combatants would be them vs Mengele & Co., and it would be an undeclared war, but a war nonetheless. At least, that's how I see it.

    Let me know if I'm exhausting this subject. I apologize but my understanding is still lacking.

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  6. And I think confusing the issue might be that perhaps you think I'm approaching this moral issue from the "they had it coming"/execution/punishment perspective. I'm not really. I'm coming at it from the obvious-evil-he-will-commit-tomorrow-should-be-stopped-and-I-can-only-think-of-one-way perspective. So for me, I'm only addressing the defense of others. I wish to withdraw from the death penalty debate.

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  7. and just to solidify that last comment, I'm not in favor of a non-lawful-authority executing that Nazi in Ohio (whatever his name was) no matter what he did and even if no lawful authority is around. I'm only talking about clear and present dangers unrelated to atrocities already committed.

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  8. Does this mean that the movie Valkyrie was immoral? I haven't seen it yet, but my hubby and I had a debate about whether or not it was moral to plot to murder Hitler. I said that it was not, but could not articulate why. He argued it was moral.

    --Cari

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  9. Tom: I was actually thinking of Enemy at the Gates, too, because it's really relevant to this discussion. What is the difference between shooting enemy officers behind enemy lines and shooting Dr. Mengele in a place of your choosing?

    I would argue that one is shooting an enemy combatant on the battlefield, and the other is shooting a non-combatant. If Mengele was also a high-ranking general (or, really, any military officer), who was dictating military strategy, you could argue for assassinating him as a strategic decision made to win the war.

    Cari: I think von Stauffenberg's plot probably was immoral. But I am loath to cast judgement, as I probably would have done the same thing in his position.

    Of course, now I find myself in the uncomfortable position of having to argue why killing Hitler was not a strategic military decision. Perhaps you could kill Hitler so long as he was on "the battlefield"? But what exactly is that?

    Dang, this is a tough question.

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  10. I'm not sure how I can accept the distinction between military and civilian in a purely moral/philisophical discussion (ie not legal) when they're only real distinction in such a scenario is something akin to a club membership.

    From a Jewish prisoner perspective, what's the difference between a military strategist and the guy who's plotting your death the next morning? Am I nuts for not seeing a distinction between my own personal war as a prisoner and a globally recognised and declared war?

    I suppose the weakness in my understanding/argument might be found in that every death you deliberatley inflict must have a strategic benefit? I'm not sure if that's true... but it sounds like it might be... Then again, it might come down to how you define strategic... for instance, I have no problem with shooting retreating military which might not appear strategic to some, but to me it strategically reduces the number who can regroup for further engagements.

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  11. Don't get me wrong, I don't think killing non-combatants is acceptable. I think I have a problem labeling him a non-combatant. Perhaps even more shockingly, I have a problem labeling anyone involved in the war effort a non-combatant.

    Separate from this discussion, I might need a refresher course on when it's acceptable or unacceptable to kill those whose deaths would benefit your side.

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  12. I guess another problem I have is how it sounds like we have one set of morals for war and another for peace. It seems when we alternate between the "battlefield" and prison, or "non-combatant" and "military strategist", but (stop me if I'm getting too repetative) the only people who can perceive a difference are those not involved. What is the objective difference between Mengele vs resisting Jew prisoner and Rommel vs Patton?

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  13. I'm going to have to spend a lot of time with Aquinas. So far I got him to agree with me that ambushes are okay, though now I'm struggling with his claim that we cannot deceive the enemy with words... he is not making my psy-ops campaign plan easy. Further updates to follow as I (re)learn them.

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  14. (and just so you know the next thought that went through my mind since I know you so badly want to know)

    I suppose some kind of case could be made for Menegele falling into the "Tyrant by usurpation" category (which is much easier to argue than "Tyrant by oppression") since I think a case could be made against Hitler and the Nazi party for usurping power.

    But that argument doesn't help me much. Although it'd still be a good argument, I'd be forced to find another analogy. In case you couldn't figure it out, I'm not discussing Menegele. I'm trying to argue a case for killing a "tyrant of oppression" who has the "law" on their side, indirect results aside of course. I've already agreed to the principle of double effect.

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  15. ARGH!!! I can't read the english translation of Aquinas' arguments in favor of rebellion (II-II, Q. xlii, a.2 aka COMMENTARIA IN LIBRUM SECUNDUM SENTENTIARUM - BOOK II: Distinction 44) until December!

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  16. Fr. William Saunders has written on the subject of justifiable tyrannicide. You can find it here. EWTN has many of Fr. Saunders' articles in their online library.

    Fr. Saunders says, referring to a tyrant by oppression,

    "However, if the tyrant by oppression attacks the citizen, jeopardizes the welfare of the community with the intent leading it to destruction or killing the citizens, or commits other evils, then a private citizen can morally commit an act of justifiable tyrannicide. Moreover, if because of the tyrant's rule, a nation cannot defend itself, is on the course of destruction, and has no lawful means to depose or to condemn the tyrant, then a citizen may commit an act of justifiable tyrannicide. Interestingly, many modern political philosophers would posit that a leader who abuses power and has become tyrannical ipso facto loses legitimacy and becomes an usurper."

    Fr. Saunders goes on to say, "Please note that the Church has not definitively taught on this subject." But he adds, "Keep in mind that an act of justifiable tyrannicide would have to be an act of last resort, when no other reasonable course of action is available to protect the community."

    Fr. Saunders specifically cites the case of the plot of Lieutenant Colonel Klaus von Stauffenberg and the generals as a case of justifiable tyrannicide since they believed it was the only way to "save Germany from devastating defeat and form a new government."

    Fr. Saunders says, "Von Stauffenberg reportedly met with Cardinal Count Preysing of Berlin to discuss this matter, and his eminence honored the motives and offered no theological objection to restrain him."

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  17. But if you assassinate Hitler, wouldn't Himmler attempt to take his place? (Filling the power vacuum)

    From a cobbling of too many Military Channel shows, I understood that even Hitler was worried that Himmler would attempt to replace him.

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  18. OK, Tom, I think you can safely use the word "Tiller" now...
    --Cari

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  19. Briefly -

    The rules are not different for wartime. Just war is self-defense, or defense on behalf of another, but on a large scale.

    Combatants are those who take up arms, not doctors, even if the doctors are doing evil murderous things.

    It would be a completely legitimate act of defense for one of the Jewish prisoners or the German guards to kill Dr. Mengele when he was in the act of killing one of his victims, or was just about to (e.g. he had the syringe in his hand, about to inject the victim). You can't easily claim it was defense if you shoot him while he was just sitting at his desk.

    You can't think of it as an execution for the reason Joe stated, that even if he clearly deserves it, you are not a lawful authority that may conduct executions.

    Ambushing combatants during wartime isn't wrong for the reasons Aquinas states. Basically, during wartime, you should expect the enemy to do the unexpected, like ambushes. A similar argument might be made for some intelligence operations. You are not, of course, required to communicate amongst your units in a way that will easily be understood correctly by your enemy.

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  20. I don't know how to explain it, but the idea that you have to wait for an inoportune time to kill Mengele (namely the moment before he attempts to kill) as opposed to when you are least capable of killing him just doesn't work for me. Menegele can't fit the non-combatant role just because he doesn't think of himself in a war. If you are justly fighting for your survival, I'd say you are in a war. And anyone whom you can reasonably assume will kill you (Mengele) should be taken out at your convenience, not theirs...

    I really wish I could think of how to argue that case... But I just can't make sense of it any other way.

    Again, I'm not arguing for "justice" or the right to execute. I'm arguing for the right to kill him before he can act again or when your only opportunity with a chance of success arrises. An ambush if you will. No need to drag "assasinate" into it, since that implies a non-combat kind of thing.

    I guess I can leave it all with agreeing to Gandma B's EWTN link:

    "if the tyrant by oppression attacks the citizen, ... then a private citizen can morally commit an act of justifiable tyrannicide....

    Please note that the Church has not definitively taught on this subject"

    I'm willing to accept that this subject can be left up to individual consciences, at least until there is official Church teaching.

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  21. Watch your definitions. War is an action of a state. An individual is not a state by definition, and therefore cannot be at war in the way you describe it. Justly fighting for your survival (self-defense) does not have to be called "war" to be just.

    And your argument doesn't apply to the guards at all. They are never directly threatened by the doctor.

    The best thing to do in a situation like theirs where you witness great evils perpetrated by "your" side, and the regime is corrupt or evil to the point where no recourse is available, would be to attempt to organize an escape yourself, or sabotage the facilities, or some other act of sedition. It's hard to imagine a situation where the only available options are assisting in evil or assassination.

    I really don't think you can classify the doctor as a combatant in the situation described.

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  22. "They are never directly threatened by the doctor." That's why I switched halfway down this page and replaced them with Jewish prisoners as the main subject of my argument.

    I guess don't have much of an argument against the definitions, but I'd like to adjust the term "state" to be a little more flexible than it comes off sounding. I think that a rebellion by members of a state could be thought of as a war (like the civil war). I don't know that a particular quantity has to be reached before it counts. While I'd assume that a 2 person "state" would be kind of absurd, I'm not sure there is a quantity you can draw the line at.

    "The best thing to do in a situation like theirs..." No question there. I wasn't trying to posit that my plan was the "best" thing to do, but whether or not there existed conditions under which it could be objectively good. I'm even going so far to say that we should ignore the indirect consequences of the action so that we can evaluate the action in the absense of likely outcomes. I don't want to argue over practical solutions to tyrany, since everything I'm talking about is a last case scenario.

    "Justly fighting for your survival (self-defense) does not have to be called "war" to be just.... I really don't think you can classify the doctor as a combatant in the situation described."

    Well maybe I just take that route because it's the easiest way for my brain to make it work. I'm a little short on examples but let me give it another try...
    If Odysseus and his men were trapped by a giant cyclops, and they didn't have a means of blinding him, but they did have a friggin' keg of arsenic handy (Why?), I don't have a problem with them poisoning him to death before they take off. Please ignore the ambiguity of killing non-humans and treat the cyclops with the same level of gravity so that we can discuss this. It's a serious likelyhood that the cyclops will kill them all. It is also a serious likelyhood that if they try to sneak out that he will hunt them down, so they should take advantage of his weakened state even if he's causing no harm at the time. I don't see a problem in killing him in a kind of preemptive defense.

    I don't think this enters into the "you can't kill a man for a crime he hasn't yet committed" arena. I think this enters into the clear and present danger category, which I'm not necessarily convinced is limited to only states being able to act on.

    But for all practical purposes, I'm with you. I DON'T want my fellow man to make these judgement calls on their own. I don't trust my fellow man. I just can't seem to conclude that these actions are objectively always wrong even if we humans screw up these decisions 100% of the time.

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  23. also please no one follow up with "How will Odysseus get the door open?" I'm short on examples that work. Lets just pretend that they can open the door but that the door will make a loud noise that would wake up the cyclops.

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  24. Animal cruelty! This horse is soooo dead!

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  25. Ignoring the case of the cyclops and returning to the case of Mengele/Tiller (pardon me, Tom):

    We have the right to defend ourselves from attack, and we have an obligation to defend the innocent, especially those who cannot defend themselves, whether in the context of war or not.

    The means we use for self-defense or the defense of others must be proportionate to the danger. Lethal means are only licit in the case of lethal danger from an attacker, when other non-lethal means are not sufficient to remove the threat.

    If someone has a pattern of killing people and is known or reasonably assumed to be planning to kill others, it seems to me to be justifiable to do whatever is necessary to prevent him from being able to carry out his plan any further. One doesn't have to wait until he is in the act of attacking someone. The intent or act of planning is a part of the attack.

    One should always use the least force necessary to accomplish this objective. Killing an attacker should be the last resort only, when there are no other effective means available.

    There are important differences between the cases of Mengele and Tiller. In the case of Mengele, the entire civil order had been corrupted to the point that civil authority permitted Jews and others to be brutally imprisoned and killed. In the case of Tiller, the civil order had not been totally corrupted. There were some evil laws regarding abortion, but the basic structure was still sound, and there was hope of legal means of defense.

    I believe there were still licit and non-lethal means available to try to stop Tiller. Changing the laws or seeking enforcement of existing laws were foremost. There may have been lawsuits that could have been filed against him to inhibit his ability to continue his business. There were also possibilities for civil demonstrations and even civil disobedience. I'm sure that others who are more knowledgeable than I would know what were good and prudent methods to use.

    My point is that killing Tiller was not justified because there were other licit ways to try to stop him. In WWII Germany, there may have been no other way to stop Mengele and defend his victims than to kill him.

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  26. So then to clarify (or I guess restate), then if there are no licit ways or reasonable means of less force to stop a butcher like Mengele, then the act of killing him is not objectively wrong? Therefore killing him is not objectively wrong because of who he is (as it might be if he was a 4 year old minding his own business), but rather the action might be wrong because of surrounding circumstances unrelated to/unaffected by him (available licit means, means of less than lethal force...).

    Correct? And my assertion -- that it is ludicrous to avoid killing someone like that just so that they can have the chance to "turn away from evil" -- is true?

    Or does that not follow from your statement, Grandma B?

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